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Abstract:  
As public research institutions are increasingly pressured to transfer research results to industry, 
evaluation of their performance is not only based on their scientific output but also on their 
commercialization success. Although it is well known that research cooperation activities are an 
important channel of knowledge transfer, the knowledge about factors driving research cooperation 
is limited. This paper explicitly focuses on scientist perspective and investigates the relevance of 
academic values and perceived costs and benefits of cooperation for a scientist's decision to 
cooperate with private firms. Our analysis is based on two survey waves performed with scientists 
in the Max Planck Society in Germany which is a publicly funded research organization focusing on 
basic research. Our empirical results suggest that open science identity is an important 
determinant of scientist fundamental decision to cooperate with private firms at all. The decision to 
keep on cooperating with private firms is directly influenced by cost sharing incentives and by firms' 
confidentiality requirements. Besides these direct effects, our results suggest that perceived 
reputational reward, monetary benefits, and time costs associated with cooperation influence 
cooperation behavior indirectly through their impact on the attractiveness of cooperation. The latter 
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ISBN 978- 87-7873-309-2 1 Introduction
In facing stiening economic competition policymakers have called on universities and pub-
lic research institutions to transfer knowledge more eectively in order to make the best
societal use of academic research (Cohen et al., 2002, 1998; Buenstorf, 2009). For this rea-
son, university administrators, deans and scientists, thereby, face the task of transforming
universities and public research labs into more entrepreneurial organizations incorporating
knowledge transfer to the private sector as part of the mission science has to fulll. The suc-
cess of knowledge transfer, however, depends on scientists' willingness to commercialize their
research ndings, as scientists can hardly be forced to do so. Therefore, leaders of research or-
ganizations, who want to improve the commercialization performance of their organizations,
should understand the individual benets and drawbacks associated with commercialization
activities which determine the scientists' decision to commercialize their research ndings.
Due to the changing role of public research institutions and the task of advancing com-
mercial research, over the past few decades scholarly literature has increasingly focused on
scientists' commercialization activities. However, this strand of literature focuses for the
most part on academic entrepreneurship (see e.g. Powers and McDougall, 2005; Bercovitz
and Feldman, 2008; Stuart and Ding, 2006) and academic patenting (see e.g. Azoulay et al.,
2007; Henderson et al., 1998; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). While providing interesting and
important insights, studies on academic entrepreneurship and university patenting do not
reveal a complete picture. The founding of a new rm based on university inventions is a
rare event and patent data has limited explanatory power as both rms and scientists ac-
knowledge that patents account for a relatively small proportion of knowledge transfer to the
private sector (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Cohen et al., 2002). In contrast, collaborative
research with private rms represents the most frequently used form of knowledge transfer
(Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Sellenthin, 2009). Furthermore, rms value transfer via di-
rect interaction with academic scientists as the most important source of knowledge (Cohen
et al., 2002). In view of this evidence it is surprising that cooperative research projects have
1not been studied to the same extent as entrepreneurship or patenting. Cooperative research
projects allow the ow of tacit knowledge which is often described as being of crucial im-
portance in the successful commercialization of science (Zucker et al., 1998; Pavitt, 1998;
Fleming and Sorenson, 2004).
The present study aims to examine why scientists decide to cooperate with private rms
in order to improve our understanding of this relevant transfer channel. Even at face value
an individual scientist's decision to perform cooperative research projects with private rms
is not straightforward. Scientists need to weigh up the benets and the drawbacks of com-
mercializing scientic results. Therefore values relating to the scientic reward system are
likely to be a crucial factor in shaping scientists' decision about whether or not to cooperate
with private rms at all. Apart from the question why scientists cooperate with private rms
at all, it is also important to assess why scientists with cooperation experience engage in
further cooperation. In the present study we propose that reputation, monetary incentives
and time constraints inuence the subsequent cooperation behavior of those scientists with
cooperation experience.
In order to examine cooperation behavior empirically, we make use of a dataset obtained
through survey interviews conducted with scientists of the Max Planck Society (MPS) in
Germany. Scientists were interviewed by phone in two survey waves. An initial survey was
implemented with the aim of identifying the group of scientists with cooperation experience
and examining scientists' appeal of research cooperation with private rms. In a follow-
up survey, those scientists with cooperation experience were interviewed again six to seven
months later. The data obtained in the initial survey allows us to examine how scientists'
attitude towards open science as well as the reputational reward associated with commer-
cial research relate to scientists' cooperation experience. In order to assess the impact of
cooperation attractiveness on cooperation, we also focus on the attractiveness of research
cooperation as identied by individual scientists. Using the information from the follow-up
survey, we are able to analyze how private benets such as the monetary gains and rep-
2utational award associated with cooperative research with private rms and the perceived
drawbacks in terms of time costs inuence scientists subsequent cooperation behavior. In
our empirical analysis the inclusion of attractiveness allows us to investigate both the direct
and indirect (mediated by cooperation attractiveness) eects of explanatory variables on
cooperation behavior.
Our results suggest that reputational rewards from commercialization and open science
identity are important factors in explaining why some scientists cooperate and others do not.
Both cooperation experience and subsequent cooperation behavior are highly inuenced by
individual attractiveness of cooperation. Among scientists who already have cooperation
experience nancial benets, reputational reward and time demand associated with cooper-
ation activities inuence individual attractiveness of cooperation but do not directly inuence
individual decision on subsequent cooperation. Thus, time and monetary aspects have an
indirect inuence on cooperation behavior mediated by cooperation attractiveness. The se-
crecy requirements of rms have a negative direct eect on the probability of engaging in
future cooperations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The theory and hypotheses are
derived in section 2. Section 3 describes the framework of our study, which is based on two
survey waves conducted with scientists within the Max Planck Society. In order to provide
the reader with necessary background information, the institutional setting of Max Planck
Society Institutes is introduced followed by a description of the research methodology. In
section 4, the variables of interest are introduced and descriptive statistics as well as sample
characteristics are presented. The empirical analysis and estimation results are presented in
section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and section 7 concludes.
32 Theoretical framework
The Entrepreneurial University: Criteria of Evaluating Work in
Science
The transition from research universities and public labs to entrepreneurial organizations has
gained increasing attention among strategic management and industrial economics scholars
over the past few decades. Research groups in universities are becoming \quasi-rms" who
potentially commercialize their research results (Etzkowitz, 2003). Existing studies high-
light that since the early 1980's policymakers reacted to economic studies and government
reports which highlighted the importance of knowledge and scientic advances in industrial
innovation and, consequently, in economic growth. Thus, policy assigned research organi-
zations the role of economic actors and demanded scientists to fulll multiple tasks. Apart
from performing research and education faculty is increasingly required to transfer scientic
results more eectively to the private sector (Cohen et al., 2002; Lee, 1996).
In order to support commercial research, technology transfer oces were installed in
many US and European universities with the aim of providing support for scientists in
ling patent applications, to assists scientists in start-up activities and to connect scientists
with private actors. Observing this (external) eort to enhance scientists' commercialization
activities, scholarly concern on commercial research activities and work practices within
scientic institutions evolved. One of the key questions hereby is to what extent changing
evaluation criteria of scientic work lead scientists to alter their work practices toward higher
emphasis on bridging knowledge to the private sector.
According to organizational theory it is essential to examine the evaluation criteria of
scientic work in order to assess what incentives and determinants lead scientists to commer-
cialize their research ndings. Theoretical works argue that the important features in the
transformation process of organizations are changing values and conicting internal interests
leading to a reconsideration of work routines (see e.g. Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver,
41992). Existing organizational change models emphasize that the transformation of work
evaluation criteria occurs at the individual level but is signicantly inuenced by organi-
zational values, norms and cultures (Whelan-Berry et al., 2003; Kanter et al., 1992; Dacin
et al., 2002). Therefore, the adoption of new work criteria is especially dicult in institutions
with traditions and well-established norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kraatz and Moore,
2002). In the spirit of Merton (1957) the institution of science has such traditional academic
norms. For this reason the intended transformation of scientic institutions into key actors
in modern economies represents a challenge to leaders and deans of research institutions as
well as policymakers in providing a research climate which stimulates scientists to transfer
their knowledge to the private sector.
An ongoing discussion in the literature deals with the interrelation of changing aca-
demic values and scientists' eorts to transfer research results to private partners. Critics
of the concept of the entrepreneurial university fear that engagement with industry shifts
researchers' agendas toward applied, industry-relevant topics at the expense of academic
freedom, the traditional norm of open science and the focus on basic research (Florida and
Cohen, 1999). Yet, collaborative research projects between academic scientists and industry
employees often yield new academic insights and ideas despite the applied nature of research
aims (D'Este and Perkmann, 2010). As a result, scientists may well face both benets and
drawbacks when having to decide whether it is benecial for them to engage in collaborative
work with private rms.
To cooperate or not to cooperate { a fundamental decision
Scientists' cooperation behavior with private rms is comprised of two dierent important
stages of analysis. The rst stage of analysis deals with scientists' fundamental decision
as to whether or not to cooperate with rms at all. Academic researchers who have not
collaborated with private partners cannot rely on past experience when having to decide
whether or not to cooperate with private rms. It is dicult for these scientists to assess to
5what extent private benets arise from cooperation with private rms. We, therefore, argue
that the fundamental decision to cooperate with private rms relates to scientists' views on
the academic values of open science and reputational reward.
The value of open science
Within the discussion of values in academic science there is the view that scientic knowledge
is a public good as knowledge does not deplete when shared with others (Arrow, 1962;
Scherer, 1982). Distinguishing scientic research from technological research, Dasgupta and
David (1987) claim that scientists are thought to devote their eorts to the accumulation of
freely available knowledge. This view of open science with free dissemination of knowledge
is often shared by researchers for two reasons. Firstly, the seminal work on the sociology
of science by Merton (1957) describes the norm of communism. According to the norm of
communism scientists are incentivized to give up intellectual property rights in exchange for
recognition and esteem (Merton, 1973, p.273). This incentive leads to communist activity
in the sense that scientists share their work with the community for the common good.
Essentially, Merton's complex set for the ethos of science included that progress in science
comes by means of cooperation and collaboration between individual scientists. Scientists
identify science as open and freely distribute their knowledge and ndings to the entire
scientic community.
Moreover, researchers are incentivized to publish the outcome of their research results as
priority in discovery is the key to scientic recognition (Stephan, 1996; Stephan and Levin,
1992). When researchers communicate an advance in knowledge, they are rewarded by the
scientic community for being rst. Scientists striving for recognition will, therefore, publish
new ndings as soon as possible after their discovery. In the publication business, the time
of submission or publication makes the claim of priority more convincing (Stephan and
Levin, 1992). Thus, academic science developed institutions for rewarding the production
and dissemination of knowledge where scientists receive recognition for being the rst to
6demonstrate discovery to the scientic community (David, 2003; Hong and Walsh, 2009).
Yet, esteem from colleagues is not limited to its own rewards. Over the course of a scientic
career, recognition from colleagues potentially translates into pecuniary rewards in terms of
well-paid research positions, well-funded research projects or laboratories (Stephan, 1996).
When cooperating with private rms, knowledge is often appropriated by rms. In R&D
cooperation, novel results are concealed and meant to secure rms a competitive advantage.
In this case, it is evident that academic scientists' incentives are in conict to the goals of
industrial rms. Hall (2002) argues that scientic research and commercial innovation can
be seen as two worlds with respect to the twin goals of appropriating or diusing knowledge.
Similarly, Hong and Walsh (2009) argue that appropriation of knowledge can become an
important obstacle to science-industry cooperations. While rms intend to appropriate new
knowledge, scientists are incentivized to make their research results freely available to anyone.
From this line of reasoning, we predict that the identity of open science represents a key
obstacle for scientists in engaging in cooperation with private rms.
HYPOTHESIS 1: If scientists believe in the concept of open science and the free avail-
ability of research results, they are less likely to cooperate with private rms at all.
Reputational Rewards
While the open and free distribution of scientic results in the spirit of Merton (Merton,
1957, 1973) has dominated academia over decades, there is an ongoing debate that has
increasingly diminished this view since the late 1980's. Currently, there is widespread belief
among academics that the institution of science is facing ever more demand to become further
intertwined with commercial activity (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Hong and Walsh, 2009).
Science is increasingly demanded to provide innovative results with commercial potential
in the private sector. Starting in the early 1990s, a stream of literature evolved addressing
the changing culture of science and the emergence of a second competing point of view. This
view suggests that science is under increasing pressure to provide research results relevant to
7industry (Cohen et al., 1998; Hong and Walsh, 2009). With the increasing relevance of scien-
tic excellence in global economic competition and the diminishing proportion of university
research being publicly supported, science must in part full the tasks of commercial research
towards advancements in technology. Therefore, Hackett (1990) and Owen-Smith and Powell
(2003) argue that scientic success is increasingly measured in commercial success.
The commercialization of research results may lead to greater scientic reputation among
researchers. Owen-Smith and Powell (2003) argue, that commercialization success and the
attention of corporate partners make scientists visible in their research eld. These scientists
are often able to attract attention and funding, which, in turn, leads to greater reputation.
Such feedback loops seem plausible, as researcher quality and commercial success are comple-
ments (Thursby et al., 2001). The latter study and Buenstorf (2009) nd that higher quality
faculty results in higher license income and more sponsored research. In the case of venture
creation, scientist research productivity and entrepreneurial activity are complements (Lowe
and Gonzalez-Brambila, 2007). Moreover, rm collaboration choices are inuenced by sci-
entists' expertise. This pattern is shown by Audretsch and Stephan (1996) who detect that
rms cluster around star scientists in the biotechnology industry. Firms seemingly prot
from the expertise of reputable scientists, as Zucker et al. (2002) show that the higher a
scientist's research quality, the more important the scientist is for rms' commercial success.
Breakthrough discoveries often involve the joint work of rms with top scientists. Thus, the
increasing commercialization of science in general may shift scientists' evaluation of com-
mercialization activities. As scientists may perceive there to be an increase in academic
reputation in successfully commercializing research, we hypothesize:
HYPOTHESIS 2a: If scientists' perceive the commercialization of research as leading to
high reputational reward, they are more likely to cooperate with private rms at all.
8Scientists' motivation to engage in further cooperation
In light of the relevance of science-industry cooperation as an important knowledge transfer
channel, scientists' cooperation behavior should not be restricted to the fundamental deci-
sion whether or not to cooperate with rms at all. Apart from determinants disentangling
cooperators from non-cooperators it is also crucial to understand why scientists with coop-
eration experience decide to engage in further cooperation with private rms. While the
fundamental decision to cooperate with private rms tends be driven by scientists' attitudes
towards commercialization in general, the decision of scientists with cooperation experience
to engage in subsequent cooperation is likely to be driven by scientists' perception of the
benets and drawbacks of cooperating with industry.
Private benets: Recognition and monetary gains
One of the potential private benets of cooperation relates to the aforementioned argumen-
tation on the fundamental decision to cooperate. Scientists may expect reputational reward
from cooperating with private rms. Firms choose, in general, to collaborate with 'star' sci-
entists as they wish to come close to the scientic frontier. Thus, as noted above, scientists
may signify research quality when cooperating with private rms. We, consequently, argue
that reputational reward may not only drive scientists' fundamental decision to cooperate
with private rms or not, but also cooperators' decision to engage in further collaboration.
HYPOTHESIS 2b: If scientists with cooperation experience perceive there to be high rep-
utational rewards from cooperation of research, they are more likely to engage in subsequent
cooperation with private rms.
Monetary returns may represent a further important driver for scientists to cooperate with
private rms. By surveying science and engineering faculty in the US Lee (2000) nds that
a key motivation of scientists to collaborate with private partners is the access to resources
which secure the funding of research. We argue that { beyond the want to secure research
funding { scientists with cooperation experience may be attracted by nancial benets. If
9scientists with cooperation experience regard collaboration with private rms as nancially
lucrative, such cooperation represents a second source of income.
Furthermore, several studies nd that scientists have a preference for research (Stern,
2004) and that the most interesting research is often complete before private companies
begin showing interest in commercial applications (Aghion et al., 2005; Jensen and Thursby,
2001). These ndings suggest that scientists may only work with industrial partners if
high monetary incentives compensate scientists for less interesting work. Prior evidence of
commercializing research via disclosure indicates that scientists' will not commercialize their
ndings unless adequate royalty payments are paid to incentivize scientists to commercialize
their research (Jensen et al., 2003; Thursby et al., 2001). We expect this nding to hold in
the context of research cooperation, such that high nancial benets inuence subsequent
cooperation behavior in the subgroup of scientists with cooperation experience. cooperation
experience
HYPOTHESIS 3: If scientists with cooperation experience perceive there to be high -
nancial benets in cooperation, they are more likely to engage in subsequent cooperation with
private rms.
Time costs
The allocation of time for commercializing research may represent an important drawback
of scientists' engagement in commercialization activities. Stern (2004) argues that scientists
have a preference for doing research rather than working on possible industrial applications.
Therefore, it seems reasonable that scientists would prefer to allocate as much time as pos-
sible to academic research. Several empirical studies analyze whether commercialization
activities crowd out basic research. Most existing studies analyzing the relationship of re-
search output and commercialization eorts detect a complementary relationship. Empirical
evidence, which is mostly based on U.S. data, suggests that the patenting and disclosure
of inventions have a positive impact on publication output (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002;
10Azoulay et al., 2006). This result is also conrmed by empirical studies based on European
data (Breschi, 2007). Hence, patents and licenses may be complementary to fundamental
research as conicts between research and commercialization time are not prevalent. More-
over, time demanding tasks associated with patenting are often carried out by technology
transfer oces.
When considering research cooperation activities, the allocation of time for commer-
cialization is likely to be a more relevant obstacle compared to patenting and licensing.
Cooperative research with private rms often requires scientists to allocate time to meetings
with industry researchers in order to coordinate research. Thus, time demands in research
cooperation are relatively high compared to other transfer channels. If scientists cooperate
with private rms and experience high demands on their time, then further cooperation with
private partners is unattractive and the scientist will refrain from joint work with industry.
In view of that the following is hypothesized:
HYPOTHESIS 4: If scientists with cooperation experience perceive there to be high time
costs in cooperating with private rms research, they are less likely to engage in subsequent
cooperation with private rms.
3 Research Method
Framework of our study: The Max Planck Society
In order to analyze scientists' cooperation behavior, a survey of scientists within the MPS was
conducted. The MPS is an independent, publicly funded research organization in Germany.
Scientists from this society were chosen as the unit of analysis as MPS Institutes seek research
excellence and promote academic freedom without obligation to attract external funding.
Since research in the MPS is mostly basic and given the society's demand for excellent
research, scientists work at the frontiers of research without regard for commercial potential.
Thereby, MPS research can be described as pursuing ground-breaking new results, but not
11necessarily with the goal of application. Thus, scientists' incentives to commercialize research
are hardly aected by external pressure.
As of January, 2010, the MPS employed more than 9,000 scientists working at 78 in-
stitutes. Each institute focuses on a special, specic, statutory task, be it to research the
structure of matter, the function of our nervous system, or the birth and development of
stars and galaxies. The Max Planck Institutes are classied by the Society in three dierent
sections: the Biology and Medicine Section, the Chemistry, Physics and Technology Section
and the Humanities Section.
Although the MPS consists of many dierent institutes, the institutional setting is con-
sistent throughout. All institutes select and carry out their research autonomously and
independently within the aforementioned scope of the MPS. Each institute administers its
own budget and is free to set their research agenda. The consistent structure of MPS insti-
tutes allows us to analyze the cooperation behavior of scientists under a similar institutional
setting although scientists work in diering elds of research.
Max Planck Scientist Surveys
Initial Survey: Commercialization Activities and Attitudes towards Commer-
cialization
In order to analyze scientists' commercialization activities and attitudes towards commer-
cialization, a survey capturing possible stimuli and barriers to the commercialization of
scientic results was developed. The questionnaire contains questions with regard to sci-
entists' knowledge transfer via engagement in research cooperation, patenting and nascent
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, scientists' attitudes towards commercialization activities
as well as questions on industrial work experience, education, demographics, and time in
research were included. Survey questions were developed with the aim of quantitatively
analyzing the commercialization activities of scientists on the individual level. Questions
were improved during a pilot study conducted in August and September 2007. The pilot
12study was performed with randomly selected scientists at German research organizations,
excluding MPS scientists. With respect to cooperation behavior the initial survey allows us
to identify scientists who have any cooperation experience. Moreover, scientists assessed the
attractiveness of cooperation activities with private rms.
Before interviewing scientists of the Max Planck Society, we contacted the executive
directors and heads of administration of all MPS institutes and asked for permission to
survey the scientists in their institute. Out of the entire Society, 67 institutes allowed us
to perform our survey and provided us with the contact phone numbers of their scientists,
if these were not publicly available. Our sample population for the survey consisted of
7,808 scientists working for these 67 MPS institutes. Prior to the survey interviews, we
emailed scientists and informed them about our study. Interviews were conducted by phone
and implemented by TNS Emnid GmbH, a professional opinion research institute. Trained
interviewers from TNS Emnid GmbH contacted scientists between mid-October and mid-
December 2007. The dataset includes data from 2,604 interviews, a response rate of 33.35
percent.
Follow-Up Survey: Cooperation Behavior and Attitudes towards Cooperation
In June to July, 2008, we performed an additional survey wave with those scientists, who had
reported cooperation experience in the initial survey. This survey was designed to get more
explicit information on scientists' cooperation behavior as we asked whether or not they had
cooperated with private rms before their time at Max Planck, during their time in Max
Planck, during the last 6 months, and if they had concrete plans to cooperate with private
rms in the next two years. As this survey was performed six to eight months after the rst
interview, we are able to analyze whether scientists cooperation attractiveness { reported in
the initial survey { inuences scientists' subsequent cooperation behavior and their intent to
cooperate with rms in the near future. Furthermore, we asked the cooperators explicitly
about the benets and drawbacks associated with cooperation.
13The second step of the survey analysis was also conducted by professional interviewers of
TNS Emnid GmbH. In the initial survey we asked scientists if they were willing to participate
in a second survey. This wish was respected, so that only those scientists who agreed to
further participation were contacted again. Out of the 813 cooperating scientists identied
in the initial survey wave, 624 researchers agreed to be available for a follow-up interview.
Therefrom, we were able to conduct follow-up interviews with 476 researchers, denoting a
response rate of 76.28 per cent.
Sample Selection: Senior Scientists
Our empirical analysis focuses on senior scientists. We exclude PhD students from our
investigation because our analysis on cooperation behavior in relation to the scientic reward
system may be heavily biased when including doctorates. Though they were given the same
survey as senior researchers, results may be biased when including doctoral students. These
researchers usually do not decide whether or not they engage in collaboration with private
rms but rather follow the decision of their supervisor. Moreover, a large share of doctoral
students in Germany make career track changes to the private sector after receiving their
doctorate Schomburg and Teichler (2006).
Excluding doctoral students reduces the sample of analysis. Furthermore, we excluded
all scientists who did not answer any question relating to a variable of interest, such that
the descriptive information capture the information of the reduced sample which is used in
the econometric analysis. Due to this exclusion our sample of analysis captures 1176 senior
scientists interviewed in the initial survey wave. Within the follow-up survey we capture 240
senior scientists which completed the interview and, thus, are used in the empirical analysis.
144 Measurement of Variables
Initial Survey
Dependent variables
In order to identify scientists with cooperation experience the surveyed scientists were
asked the following question: \Have you ever cooperated or are you currently cooperating
on research with or for rms in the private sector?" In our empirical analysis cooperation
experience is a dichotomous dependent variable which takes on the value one if a scientist
reports that he or she has cooperation experience and zero otherwise. Scientists' cooperation
attractiveness is measured by the answer to the following question: \To what degree is
cooperative research with private rms an attractive idea to you?". This dependent variable
is an ordinal variable which takes on values between 1 (not attractive at all) and 5 (highly
attractive).
Explanatory variables
In order to examine the determinants of scientists' fundamental decision whether or
not to cooperate with rms we included in the questionnaire several statements associated
with commercialization activities in general. These statements refer to reputational reward
from commercialization, open science identity, and commercialization of research within a
scientist's research group as well as within his or her scientic community. In this way,
scientists were asked to what degree they agree or disagree with these statements, given a
5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In the
empirical analysis these statements are used in two ways. Firstly we use ordinal variables
reecting the Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5. Secondly, we used the change from value
3 (neutral) to 4 (agree) as the cut-o-level and induced binary variables taking a value of 1 if
scientists either agreed or strongly agreed to the statements given. Statements are presented
in Table 1.
***************************
15insert Table 1 about here
***************************
Further explanatory variables reect scientists' socio-demographic characteristics. Dier-
ent binary variables account for scientists work experience in industry, gender and German
citizenship. Additionally we account for scientists' age, the length of their time at Max
Planck and scientists' research eld and their research position. To provid a control for
research eld we use several binary variables indicating whether scientists are group leaders,
directors or postdoctoral researchers. Similarly, binary variables indicate whether or not




In the follow-up survey we asked scientists with cooperation experience whether they
had cooperated with private rms during the last six months and whether they had concrete
plans to cooperate with private rms within the next two years. The dependent variable
subsequent cooperation takes on the value one if a scientist reports that she or he has
cooperated with private rms during the last six months and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable planned cooperation takes on the value one if a scientist reports that she or he
has concrete plans for cooperation in the next two years and zero otherwise. In addition,
scientists were asked whether they cooperated with private rms during their time at Max
Planck { not counting the last six months. As a result, we are able to distinct scientists'
cooperation before their employment at Max Planck and during their time at Max Planck.
Explanatory Variables
Our explanatory variables reect whether scientists perceive there to be benets and
drawbacks related to cooperation. We explicitly provided statements to interviewees re-
ecting to what degree they perceived academic reputation, income opportunity and time
16constraints as benets or drawbacks of cooperation. Furthermore, we included statements
capturing to what extent scientists regarded cost sharing, conndentialyity problems of re-
search outcome and dierent research approaches as being associated with cooperating with
private rms. Again, scientists were asked to agree or disagree to these statements given a
5-point Likert-type scale (see Table 2). Statements are designed such that our investigation
may complement the initial survey analysis.
***************************
insert Table 2 about here
***************************
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for senior scientists' cooperation behavior are given in Table 3. The
upper half of the table reports on the proportion of scientists with cooperation experience
identied in the initial screening survey. Both, the cooperation shares as well as the attrac-
tiveness levels are given for the entire sample and separately reported for each MPS section.
The lower half of Table 3 refers to the 240 interviewed cooperators in the follow-up survey.
The table summarizes the percentage of scientists who had cooperation experience before
their MPS employment, during their engagement at MPS - not counting the last six months
- and during the last half year. Again, the shares are given separately for the entire follow-up
sample and separately reported for each MPS section.
********************
insert Table 3 about here
********************
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 4. Information is again reported
separately for the 1176 interviewed scientists in the initial screening survey and the 240
cooperators examined in the follow-up survey. Forty percent of the 1176 scientists looked at in
the initial sample have cooperation experience with private rms. Comparing the individual
17perceptions of scientists in the initial survey, it can be seen that scientists attach much
importance to the value of open science reected by the statement on free accessibility of
research results. Regarding the follow-up survey it can be observed that reputational reward
and the opportunity to share research costs are considered as relatively more important
cooperation benets than income opportunity.
********************




In a rst step we analyze how scientists' views on scientic rewards as well as commercial-
ization attitudes and their research eld are related to the individual decision to cooperate
or not to cooperate. To do so, we use the data of the initial survey in which scientists were
asked whether they had cooperated with rms or not, irrespective of the time of cooperation.
The dependent variable of the empirical analysis is a dummy variable that takes the value
one if a scientist has cooperation experience and zero otherwise. This analysis is provided
in Model 1a which is estimated by using a logit regression model (see Appendix A1). As
our baseline model we estimate scientists' likelihood of having cooperation experience as
dependent on attractiveness of cooperation and further control variables (relevance of com-
mercialization in one's research eld, PhD discipline and personal characteristics). We then
include the measures of scientists' attitudes towards the free availability of scientic results
and reputational rewards as further variables.
As explained in Section 2 it can be expected that the decision to engage in further
cooperation is determined by other factors than just the decision to cooperate at all. In order
to analyze scientists' subsequent cooperation behavior we examine scientists cooperation
18activities subsequent to the rst interview. To do this we rely on the information provided
in the follow-up survey as cooperators identied in the initial survey were asked whether
they had cooperated with rms in the past six months subsequent cooperation.
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that results may be aected by endogeneity
problems. As causation is a central issue in strategy research recent studies by (Durand and
Vaara, 2009) and (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) point out statistical analysis can suer
from biased coecient estimates when potential endogeneity problems are not taken into
account. With respect to our empirical analysis of the fundamental decision to cooperate
or not (Model Ia) concerns may be raised about reverse causality, as it could be that co-
operation experience may aect the perceived attractiveness of cooperation or vice versa.
Further cooperation and attractiveness of cooperation may both be inuenced by an unob-
served (omitted) variable causing endogeneity. Such endogeneity problems would not arise
if the attractiveness of cooperation were more or less constant over time, e.g. attractiveness
was already high before a scientist decided to cooperate. As time invariance of perceived
cooperation attractiveness is a strong assumption, we acknowledge that the possibility of
endogeneity cannot be completely ruled out in Model 1a. Thereby, we can only refer to cor-
relations rather than causation. For the empirical analysis of subsequent cooperation (Model
1b), however, potential endogeneity should be a lesser problem for two reasons: Firstly, all
scientists of the subsample of cooperators have cooperation experience, so that no bias can
result from not having cooperation experience. Secondly, the attractiveness measure is taken
from the screening survey which was conducted six to eight months before the follow-up sur-
vey wave was implemented { and the indicator for subsequent cooperation activities does
not cover the time of the initial survey.
Moreover, endogeneity may hardly arise when analyzing to what extent explanatory vari-
ables predict planned cooperation behavior in the next two years. Thus, in order to provide
a comprehensive and reliable analysis on scientists' cooperation behavior we test whether
the personal benets and drawbacks associated with science-industry cooperation aected
19scientists' intention to engage in cooperation with private rms in the near future. To do this
we rely on the data obtained in the follow-up survey since questions on cooperation benets
were provided only to scientists' with cooperation experience (in the follow-up survey wave).
In Model 1c we estimate to what extent private benets, research eld and demographics
inuence scientists' planned cooperation behavior.
Attractiveness of Cooperation
In order to provide a full picture of scientists' cooperation behavior, we analyze what fac-
tors shape scientists' appeal (expressed attractiveness) to cooperation in a second step. We
thereby analyze the relationship between the perceived attractiveness of cooperation and
open science identity, reputational rewards, nancial benets, and time demand of com-
mercialization activities in general and cooperation in particular. This second step is done
to investigate whether the relationship between cooperation behavior and these factors is
mediated by the attractiveness of cooperation. It is possible, for instance, that there is no
direct relationship between these variables and cooperation behavior but that they inuence
the attractiveness of cooperation which in turn is related to cooperation behavior. Since
our dataset contains measures of cooperation as well as an indicator for the attractiveness
of cooperation we are able to analyze this indirect link. Again, we analyze attractiveness
indicators in both the initial and the follow-up survey results. The analysis of Model 2a is
based on data obtained in the initial survey. We investigate to what extent the perception
of open science and reputational benets associated with commercialization in general relate
to the attractiveness of cooperation. Using the data obtained in the follow-up survey, we
are able to estimate how the private benets and drawbacks associated with research co-
operation activities with private rms relate to the perceived attractiveness of cooperation
(Model 2b). Since the dependent variable is an ordinal variable, we make use of an ordered




In Table 5 the results of Model 1a { the analysis on determinants of scientists' cooperation
experience { are presented. Both, coecients and marginal eects for the baseline and the
extended model are presented. In columns (5) and (6) all ordinal explanatory variables are
included as binary variables which take a value 1 if the ordinal variable takes a value of
4 or 5. These results suggest that cooperation experience is signicantly positively related
to cooperation attractiveness. Furthermore, our measure of open science is signicantly
negatively related to cooperation experience which can be observed in the estimation results
presented in columns (3) to (6). This evidence is in support of our hypothesis H1. The more
scientists agree that their research results should be freely available, the less likely it is that
these scientists have cooperation experience. With respect to reputational reward we do not
nd any evidence in Model 1a that reputation is directly related to scientists cooperation
experience (as predicted in hypothesis H2a).
********************
insert Table 5 about here
********************
Moreover, apart from cooperation attractiveness and open science identity we nd that
scientists' perceived commercial potential of their research relates to their cooperation expe-
rience. The coecients and marginal eects of the two measures reecting the basic research
focusing of a scientist's research group and the extent of commercialization in a scientist's
research community are signicant and respectively negatively and positively related to co-
operation experience. Further, German scientists, group leaders and scientists with work
experience in industry are more likely to have cooperation experience.
Subsequent cooperation
21We turn now to the results of Model 1b { the estimation of a logit model based on
the data of the follow-up survey where the dependent variable is subsequent cooperation
denoting cooperation activity in the past six months. The results are presented in Table 6
which reports the coecients and marginal eects for the baseline and the extended model.
In columns (5) and (6) we again include all ordinal explanatory variables as binary variables
which take on the value 1 if the ordinal variable takes a value of 4 or 5 in order to check the
robustness of our results.
********************************
insert Table 6 about here
********************************
As can be seen from the Table 6 the estimated coecient and the estimate of the aver-
age marginal eect of attractiveness of cooperation are statistically signicant and positive.
However, this eect does not remain signicant when restricting the analysis to the binary
variables (see columns (5) and (6)). With respect to the reputational benets associated with
cooperation we do not nd evidence in support of H2b, which predicted a direct link between
perceived reputational reward and cooperation behavior. Regarding nancial benets from
cooperation our results point to a negative eect of income opportunities associated with
cooperation. This eect is, however, only statistically signicant if ordinal measure is used
(Columns 3 and 4) but not if we include the respective dummy variable (Columns 5 and 6).
Hence, hypothesis H3 is not supported by our results.
Furthermore, we nd weak evidence in support of our hypothesis H4, as time costs
are negatively related to probability of being engaged in subsequent cooperation activities.
The eect is signicant at the 10 percent level in models presented in columns (3),(4) and
(6). Moreover, those scientists who agree that cooperaton helps to increase their research
budget are more likely to engage in subsequent cooperation activities whereas scientists who
believe that their results are not applicable for industrial purposes are less likely to cooperate.
Estimated coecients and marginal eects are signicant at the 1 percent level (see Columns
22(3)-(6)). In addition, directors are more likely to engage in subsequent cooperation activities.
Planned Cooperation
In order to test to what extent the private benets associated with cooperation eect
scientists' cooperation behavior we additionally examine scientists' plans to cooperate in
the next two years. Similar to the previous models we provide estimates using coopera-
tion attractiveness, the perceived relevance of commercialization in scientists' research eld,
PhD discipline and demographic measures as explanatory variables (columns (1) and (2)).
Measures regarding benets and drawbacks associated with cooperation are included in es-
timations reported in columns (3) to (6).
Results are shown in Table 7. The estimation results suggest that attractiveness of coop-
eration predicts planned cooperation behavior. The estimated coecient of attractiveness of
cooperation as well as the average marginal eect are statistically signicant throughout all
regressions. Scientists reporting in the initial survey that they nd cooperation attractive or
highly attractive have a 12.9 percentage points higher probability of having concrete plans for
cooperation activities with private rms within the next two years than other scientists (see
Column 6). In contrast, expected reputational rewards, nancial benets or time demand of
cooperation activities with private rms are not signicantly related to planned cooperation
activities. Hence, the results do not point to a direct link between planned cooperation and
perceived personal benets and drawbacks of cooperation. The probability of having con-
crete plans for cooperation activities is, however, negatively aected by perceived problems
due to condentiality requirements by rms and by perceived non-applicability of scientists'
own research for industrial purposes. Scientists who are of the opinion that condentiality
is a problem have a 20.7 percentage points lower probability of having concrete plans for
cooperation activities (see Column 6).
********************************
insert Table 7 about here
********************************
23To sum up, our results suggest that academic values are directly related to cooperation
experience whereas there is only very weak evidence for a direct link between cooperation
behavior and the individual benets and drawbacks of cooperation. The perceived attrac-
tiveness of cooperation, however, is directly linked to cooperation experience, subsequent
cooperation activities, and planned cooperation activities. The marginal eects of attrac-
tiveness of cooperation on the probability of cooperation are presented graphically in Figure
1. As pointed out by (Wiersema and Bowen, 2009) the assessment of marginal eects and
their respective z-statistic values is best done graphically and we therefore plot these values
against the predicted value of the outcomes, i.e. cooperation experience, subsequent coop-
eration, and planned cooperation. Marginal eects and z-statistics are computed for each
observation using the results of logit estimations presented in Column (1) of Tables 5, 6 and
7. As can be seen from Figure 1 the marginal eects of the attractiveness of cooperation
are positive for all observations (1176 for cooperation experience and 240 for subsequent
and planned cooperation). Moreover, the estimates are statistically signicant for all ob-
servations in the case of cooperation experience. For subsequent and planned cooperation
activities z-statistic is below 1.96 in absolute value at high or low probabilities of subsequent
and planned cooperation activities. Hence, the relationship between cooperation behavior
and attractiveness of cooperation is positive and statistically signicant. This suggests that
individual motivation of scientists is important for establishing and maintaining cooperation
activities with private rms.
********************************




Although we do not nd much evidence for a direct link between cooperation behavior
24and reputational awards, nancial benets, and time costs associated with cooperation ac-
tivities, there might be an indirect link mediated by the attractiveness of cooperation. We
therefore turn now to the second step of the empirical analysis of Model 2a where the depen-
dent variable is the attractiveness of cooperation and explanatory variables are scientists'
attitudes towards commercialization in general. By using data gathered in the initial sur-
vey, we investigate empirically whether scientists' attitudes towards commercialization aect
cooperation behavior indirectly through their inuence on the attractiveness of cooperation.
Table 8 reports on the estimation results of ordered logit regressions where the attitudes
towards commercialization are the explanatory variables. In columns (1) and (2) the baseline
is presented, which only includes open science identity and reputational rewards associated
with commercialization activities as independent variables. Extended models are presented
in columns (3) and (4) which also include commercialization relevance in scientists' research
eld, PhD discipline and demographic variables. Again, we use scientists perceptions as both
ordinal explanatory variables { referring to 5-point-scales: see columns (1) and (3) { and as
binary variables which take on the value 1 if the ordinal variable takes a value of 4 or 5 { see
columns (2) and (4). The t statistics suggest that the attitudes towards commercialization
have explanatory power and that the t is improved when controls are included.1
********************************
insert Table 8 about here
********************************
Two striking results are that scientists attitudes toward free accessibility of research re-
sults are negatively while reputational reward are positively related to scientists' cooperation
attractiveness. In all four models presented the eect of both variables is statistically sig-
nicant at the 1 percent level. Combining these results with the strong positive eect of
attractiveness of cooperation on cooperation behavior, this result suggests that there are
1Statistical tests suggest that cut-points are statistically signicant and therefore using the 5 point Likert-
type scale of the dependent variable is appropriate. Robust standard errors are reported which correct for
clustering eects at the institute level.
25indirect eects of open science identity and reputational reward on cooperation behavior
which supports our hypotheses H1 and H2a.
Follow-Up Survey
The second analysis of cooperation attractiveness is based on the sample of cooperators
and includes scientists' attitudes towards cooperation as explanatory variables. We acknowl-
edge that this analysis requires the assumption that the scientists' perceived attractiveness
of cooperation has not changed considerably between the initial and the follow-up survey,
since the attractiveness of cooperation was measured in the initial survey while some of the
explanatory variables stem from the follow-up survey. However, only scientists with cooper-
ation experience participated in the follow-up survey and it is not very likely that scientists
who already knew the benets and drawbacks of cooperation activities with private rms
would quickly change their mind. Table 9 reports the results of Model 2b. Similar to the
aforementioned analysis our baseline model captures solely the variables reecting scien-
tists' personal benets of cooperation and its drawbacks, while extended models use further
explanatory variables as controls.
********************************
insert Table 9 about here
********************************
As seen in Table 9 the estimated coecient of reputational reward is positive and statis-
tically signicant. This result indicates that within the subsample of cooperating scientists
reputational reward indirectly aect scientists' subsequent cooperation behavior. This indi-
rect eect supports our hypothesis H2b, which states that scientists with cooperation expe-
rience are more likely to engage in further cooperation if they nd cooperation is increases
their scientic reputation. Moreover, with respect to nancial benets we nd that the vari-
able reecting scientists' opportunity to gain personal income is signicantly and positively
related to scientists' cooperation attractiveness. Given the strong positive eect of cooper-
ation attractiveness and cooperation behavior we nd a further indirect eect { of income
26opportunity on cooperation behavior. Moreover, we nd that time costs are an important
barrier to cooperation behavior as the reduction of time for own research due to cooperation
with private rms is signicantly and negatively related to cooperation attractiveness in all
four models presented.
7 Discussion
Our survey of scientists working at Max Planck Institutes in Germany shows that research
cooperation is a frequently used channel of knowledge transfer. This result is in line with
the ndings of other studies (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Sellenthin, 2009). Roughly 40
percent of the surveyed scientists reported that they had cooperation experience and most of
the surveyed scientists with cooperation experience reported that they gathered cooperation
experience when working at Max Planck institutes. Moreover, among the surveyed scien-
tists with cooperation experience roughly 43 percent are engaged in subsequent cooperation
activities and more than 50 percent plan to cooperate with private rms in the next two
years.
Against the background of complete public funding of Max Planck Institutes and their
focus on basic research, the strong involvement of Max Planck scientists in cooperation
activities with private rms is striking and our results suggest that individual motivation
is important for establishing and maintaining cooperation activities with private rms. In
particular, our empirical analysis provides answers to two basic questions: Why do scientists
cooperate with private rms at all? Why do some scientists proceed to cooperate with
private rms while others abandon their cooperation activities?
Our results indicate that scientists face various trade-os between scientic and com-
mercial incentives. Reputational rewards are a main determinant of scientists' fundamental
decision to cooperate with private rms at all, since they make cooperation more attractive
and thereby increase the probability of cooperation with private rms. If, however, scientists
believe in the concept of open science it is less likely that they will be engaged in research
27cooperation activities.
Once the fundamental cooperation decision is made and a scientist has gathered coop-
eration experience he or she has to decide whether or not to engage in further cooperation
activities. We nd that subsequent cooperation behavior and planned cooperation activi-
ties are positively related to an expected increase in income and reputational rewards from
cooperation while being negatively related to expected time demand. However, expected rep-
utational rewards, income and time demand do only indirectly aect subsequent cooperation
behavior and planned cooperation activities via their inuence on cooperation attractive-
ness but not directly. In other words, the eects are mediated by cooperation attractiveness.
Furthermore, the probability of future engagement in cooperation activities is inuenced by
rms' condentiality requirements. Scientists with cooperation experience who agree that
condentiality is a problem { because industrial partners wish or contractually enforce that
results will not be published { are less likely to engage in future cooperation activities.
Implications for leaders and managers of scientic institutions
Successful technology transfer has become an important element in the evaluation of the
performance of scientic institutions. For leaders of scientic institutions who aim at increas-
ing knowledge transfer to the private sector, it is essential to account for scientists' trade-o
between the expected benets from cooperation and the cost associated with cooperation.
Our results show that both monetary and reputational rewards positively aect the at-
tractiveness of cooperation which in turn increases the probability of cooperating with private
rms. Hence, our results indicate that there are two ways for managers of scientic insti-
tutions to motivate scientists to engage in cooperation and compensate them for the cost
of cooperation. First, monetary benets that are directly related to cooperation with pri-
vate rms tend to lead to more cooperation. Therefore management of scientic institutions
may advertise rewards for successful cooperation activities. Second, non-monetary repu-
tation eects that are directly related to cooperation activities are also likely to motivate
scientists, e.g. honors for successful cooperation activities. One may ask, however, whether
28such monetary and non-monetary rewards will reduce scientist incentives to conduct basic
research. Theoretical results suggest that commercial rewards may not only induce the re-
searcher to develop more and to reduce research eorts but may also aect the choice of the
research project. Banal-Estanol and Macho-Stadler (2010, p.187) show theoretically \that
the introduction of commercial rewards prompts researchers to increase the search for (ex
post) high quality ideas, which are more likely to be generated through (ex ante) to riskier
research programs". If basic research is associated with high uncertainty this may imply
that commercial incentives do not necessarily lead to a reduction in basic research.
Moreover, the management of scientic institutions has to deal with problems accruing
from the condentiality requirements of private rms. On the one hand these requirements
may be in conict with individual open science identity and may therefore reduce the at-
tractiveness of cooperation. On the other hand many scientic institutions have strict pub-
lication requirements, i.e. research results have to be published. In such a case a scientist
may fall between two stools. While private partners require condentiality, publication rules
of scientic institutions typically demand the diusion of knowledge.
From the point of view of rms this may imply that especially those rms which accept
the open science paradigm and are willing to engage in an open, non-exclusive exchange
of knowledge are more likely to cooperate with scientists in public research institutions.
This is conrmed by the results reported by Hong and Walsh (2009) examining university-
industry collaboration. They nd that collaboration with academics is more frequent in
rms if customization of information is more important than exclusivity. In turn, our results
suggest that rms need to be aware that the form of contract is likely to matter. While
rm scientists can be forced to keep results secret, public researchers are often more likely to
refrain from cooperation in case of secrecy clauses. Hence, R&D managers in private rms
intending to establish cooperation activities with scientists in public research institutes have
to make sure that open science norm is not undermined by the cooperation.
Thus, in sum our results suggest that publication requirements of scientic institutions,
29condentiality demands of private rms and time demand of cooperation may hamper sci-
entists' willingness to cooperate with private rms. In order to incentivize scientists to such
cooperation, monetary gains or reputational rewards need to be high enough to compensate
for the costs of cooperation.
Implications for future research
Our examination suggests that future analysis on scientists' cooperation behavior needs
to distinguish between the fundamental decision of whether or not to cooperate with pri-
vate rms and the decision of scientists with cooperation experience to engage in subsequent
cooperation activities with private rms. Moreover, our results suggest that the expected
benets and cost of cooperation aect scientists' cooperation behavior directly or indirectly
via their inuence on cooperation attractiveness. Consequently, studies which investigate the
eects of scientists' private benets and cost of commercialization { as income, reputation
or time demand { need to account for the possibility of mediated relationships. When only
analyzing direct eects one may erroneously conclude that such private benets do not or
only hardly aect commercialization activities. Moreover, there is a lack of theoretical re-
search with respect to scientist cooperation behavior. While there are numerous theoretical
studies that investigate scientist patenting, licensing and entrepreneurial behavior, cooper-
ation activities between scientists and industry have been largely overlooked in theory. We
believe that our results provide several suggestions for future theoretical work, as the link
between cooperation behavior and cooperation attractiveness could be further analyzed.
Finally, we acknowledge that our study has (at least) two limitations. First, the Max
Planck Society represents an institutional setting similar to research universities in the US.
Further studies in dierent academic settings would strengthen our understanding of scien-
tists' individual motivation to commercialize research. Second, our empirical analyses are
based on two survey waves which do not really allow us to investigate the development of




For the econometric analysis of Model 1a, Model 1b, and Model 1c we employ a logit model.
We assume that scientist i's propensity to engage in cooperation activities y
i, which cannot





i + ui (1)
where ui is an error term and  is a vector of unknown parameters of the explanatory
variables. We assume that the observed cooperation dummy variable yi { whether scientist
i engages in cooperation activities or not { takes the value one if y > 0 and zero otherwise.
If the cumulative distribution of ui is logistic, the probability of cooperation is given by










which is known as the logit model. Note that the estimated coecients of the logit model
must be interpreted with care as they reect the rate of change in the log-odds as xij changes.
The explanation of these coecients is therefore not very intuitive compared to the marginal
eects of explanatory variable on a scientist's probability of having cooperation activities.
Such marginal eects are given by the following computation.
@Pi
@xij
= jPi (1   Pi)
Hence, the marginal eect on the probability of cooperation has the same sign as the
estimated coecient j. However, the value of this marginal eect is not the same for all
observations but depends on the values of all explanatory variables. Moreover, the signif-
icance of this marginal eect is not identical with the signicance level of the estimated
coecient. Following Hoetker (2007), we therefore also present estimates of the average
31marginal eects. Moreover, we provide two measures of model t: McFadden's pseudo-R2
and the adjusted Count R2. The former represents a percental increase in the log-likelihood
function, while the latter reects the proportion of correct predictions adjusted for the most
frequent outcome (Hoetker, 2007).
The dependent variable of Model 2a and Model 2b, the attractiveness of cooperation,
is an ordinal variable with ve categories (5 point scale). Therefore, we make use of an
ordered logit model and assume a linear relationship between the unobserved latent variable
attractiveness of cooperation a





i + i (3)
where the vector  is a vector of unknown parameters and i are the logistically dis-
tributed errors reecting stochastic attractiveness dierences. The relationship between the
unobserved attractiveness of cooperation, a
i, and the observed ordinal scale Ai can be ex-
pressed as follows
Ai = 1 if a

i  1




= 5 if 4  a

i
where j are unknown parameters (cut-points) to be estimated. These parameters must
satisfy 1 < 2 < ::: < 5 in order for the probability of each category to be positive.
As for the binary logit model, the marginal eects of the explanatory variables on the
probabilities are not equal to the estimated coecient. The estimated coecient of an
explanatory variable reects the change of the log odds ratio of two categories if the respective
variable changes by one unit. In contrast, the marginal eect of an variable on the probability
32of a certain category does not only depend on the estimate of the respective parameter but
also on the estimates of the cut-points and the other parameters as well as on the values of
all explanatory variables. However, the sign of a coecient in an ordered logit model does
at least provide information about the sign of the eect of the respective variable on the end
response categories.2
A2: Robustness Checks
We conduct several additional estimations to check the robustness of our results.3 Since sci-
entists were asked in the follow-up survey whether they cooperated with private rms during
their time at Max Planck { not counting the last six months {, this allows us to distinguish
between scientists who cooperated solely before their employment at Max Planck Institutes
and scientists who cooperated when working for Max Planck Society. We use this informa-
tion to construct a dummy variable which takes on the value one if a scientist cooperated
when working for Max Planck Society { not counting the last six months { and zero other-
wise. This dummy variable is included as an additional explanatory variables in Model 1c
to control for unobserved eects which may inuence the individual intentions to cooperate
in the future. This does further reduce potential endogeneity problems. Estimation results
conrm our previous ndings and suggest that the marginal eect of the attractiveness of co-
operation on planned cooperation is still positive and statistically signicant. This indicates
that cooperation attractiveness is a strong and robust predictor of cooperation behavior.
Again, we nd no evidence for direct eects of reputational reward, income opportunity, and
time demand on planned cooperation activities whereas problems arising from private rms'
condentiality requirements and assumed non-applicability of research results for industrial
purposes signicantly reduce the probability of future cooperation activities with private
rms.
2Yet, it does not provide information about the sign of the eect on any other particular category and
about the magnitude of marginal eects. Therefore, marginal eects have to be calculated for each category
separately.
3In order to save space we will only briey describe these checks and their results.
33Several scientists who participated in the initial survey have not been surveyed in the
Follow-Up survey. Some refused to participate in the follow-up survey while others where
not accessible. In order to deal with a potential self-selection problem , i.e. probability
of response depends on scientists' characteristics, which may result in biased results, we
follow Heckman (1979) and estimate a selection equation where the probability of response
is explained by scientists' personal characteristics. Based on these regressions we calculated
Mills ratio and used it as an explanatory variable for the probability of having ongoing
cooperation activities. The estimated coecient of mills ratio is statistically insignicant
which suggests that self-selection is not a major problem.
LIT: [A1] Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specication error. Economet-
rica, 47(1), p. 153{161.
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Figure 1: Marginal Eects of Attractiveness of Cooperation on Cooperation Experience,
Subsequent Cooperations, and Planned Cooperations
41Table 1: Measurement of Variables: Initial survey wave
Measurement of Variables: Initial Survey
Min Variables Max
Cooperation Experience
0: no \A number of researchers and research groups 1: yes
cooperate on research projects with private
rms. This can include cooperative research,
contract research, or a joint research venture
Have you ever cooperated or are you currently
cooperating on research with or for rms in the
private sector?"
Cooperation Attractiveness
1: not attrac- \Imagine a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 5: highly
tive at all 'not attractive at all', 2 'not attractive', attractive
3 'either attractive', 4 'attractive' and
5 'highly attractive'. On this scale, to what
degree is joint research with private companies
an attractive idea to you?"
Open science identity
1: strongly \My research results should be freely 5: stronly
disagree accessible to any other researchers agree
and businesses."
Reputation: Commercialization
1: strongly \Commercialization activities increase the 5: stronlgy
disagree reputation of a scientists in my scientic agree
community."
Basic research focus in group
1: strongly \My research group focuses on basic 5: strongly
disagree research which is not suitable for agree
commercialization."
Commercialization common in research eld
1: strongly \Commercialization activities are common 5: strongly
disagree in my eld of research." agree
5-pt scale
1: strongly 2: disagree 3: neutral 4: agree 5: strongly
disagree agree
42Table 2: Measurement of Variables: Follow-up survey wave
Measurement of Variables: Follow-up survey
Min Variables Max
Subsequent Cooperation
0: no \Have you been engaged in research cooperation 1: yes
during the last six months?"
Cooperation during Max Planck
0: no \Have you been engaged in research cooperation 1: yes
during your time at Max Planck, not counting
the last six months?"
Planned Cooperation
0: no \Do you have concrete plans to engage in 1:yes
research cooperation in the next 2 years?"
Benets and obstacles of cooperation (2nd wave)
Reputation: Cooperation
1: strongly \Experience in research cooperation increases 5: strongly
disagree the scientic reputation of a researcher." agree
Income opportunity
1: strongly \Research cooperations greatly increase personal 5:strongly
disagree income opportunities of researchers." agree
Time costs
1: strongly \Doing cooperative research is time-consuming and 5: strongly
disagree therefore reduces the time for my personal scientic agree
research."
Cost sharing
1: strongly \Research cooperations already helped me 5: strongly
disagree to share the costs of research project with agree
private rms."
Condentiality
1: strongly \In research cooperations condentiality is a problem 5: strongly
disagree for researchers since industrial partners wish or agree
contractually enforce that results will not get published."
Dierent approaches: academia { industry
1: strongly \Coordination in research cooperations is problematic 5: strongly
disagree since research approaches and methods of private rms agree
dier from my research approaches and methods."
No commercial application
1: strongly \My current research is not applicable for industrial 5: strongly
disagree purposes." agree
5-pt scale
1: strongly 2: disagree 3: neutral 4: agree 5: strongly
disagree agree
43Table 3: Sample Descriptives on Scientists' Cooperation Behavior
Initial Survey
Cooperator Cooperators Non-cooperators
Share Mean att. value Mean att. value Dierence
cooperation cooperation t-test
Total Sample (1176) 39.97% (470) 3.672 3.086 ***
MPS Section
Life Science (501) 42.71% (214) 3.710 3.3366 ***
Chemistry, Physics (570) 40.71% (232) 3.668 2.964 ***
& Technology
Humanities (105) 22.86% (24) 3.375 2.605 **
Follow-Up Survey
Cooperation planned
before MPS during MPS last 6 months cooperation
Cooperator Sample (240) 49.58% (119) 78.33% (188) 43.75% (105) 52.08% (125)
MPS Section
Life Science (115) 44.35% (51) 73.04% (84) 44.35% (51) 52.17% (60)
Chemistry, Physics (111) 54.95% (61) 84.68% (94) 43.24% (48) 52.25% (58)
& Technology
Humanities (14) 50.00% (7) 71.43% (10) 42.85% (6) 50.00% (7)
Notes: The total sample of the initial screening survey comprises 1176 scientists. The follow-up sample
contains 240 scientists. In column 1 the number of scientists belonging to each section is given in brackets.
The t-test presented in the sample of the initial screening survey compares whether the attractiveness levels
of scientists having cooperated in the past and scientists without cooperation experience are statistitically
signicant. The asterisks ***,**,* indicate respectively a signicant dierence at the 1, at the 5 and at the
10 per cent level.
44Table 4: Summary Statistics: Independent Variables
Total Sample Cooperators
(Initial survey) (Follow-Up survey)




Reputation: commercialization 2.985 1.060
Open science identity 3.964 0.994
Basic research focus in group 3.327 1.150
Commercialization is common 2.560 1.048
in research eld
Benets and obstacles of
cooperation(5-pt. scales)
Reputational reward 3.392 1.033
Income opportunity 2.029 1.080
Cost sharing 3.320 1.310
Time costs 2.800 1.032
Condentiality 3.538 1.116
Dierent approaches 3.104 1.052
(academia-industry)
No commercial application 2.554 1.327
Demographic characteristics
age (years) 38.941 9.769 42.621 10.208
industry work experience (yes-no) 0.162 0.390 0.221 0.415
german citizenship 0.567 0.496 0.763 0.426
female 0.237 0.426 0.121 0.327
years worked for MPS 6.717 7.649 9.433 8.723
Research Position
Post-doctoral researcher 0.688 0.464 0.475 0.500
Group leader 0.263 0.440 0.450 0.499
Director 0.049 0.217 0.075 0.264
Research Field
Life Science Section 0.426 0.495 0.479 0.501
Chemistry, Physics 0.485 0.500 0.463 0.500
and Technology Section
Humanities Section 0.089 0.285 0.058 0.235
Notes: The total sample (initial survey) comprises 1176 scientists. The sample of the cooperators (Follow-Up
survey) comprises 240 scientists.
45Table 5: Cooperation Behavior: Cooperation Experience { Model 1a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coe. marg. e. coe. marg.e. coe.(D) marg. e. (D)
Cooperation attractiveness 0.625*** 0.111*** 0.630*** 0.111*** 0.818*** 0.154***
(0.089) (0.014) (0.095) (0.015) (0.165) (0.033)
Reputation: commercial. -0.071 -0.013 -0.092 -0.017
(0.079) (0.014) (0.166) (0.030)
Open science identity -0.196** -0.035** -0.676*** -0.131***
(0.078) (0.014) (0.178) (0.033)
Basic research focus -0.157** -0.028** -0.133** -0.024** -0.611*** -0.117***
in group (0.066) (0.012) (0.065) (0.012)* (0.117) (0.021)
Commercialization 0.301*** 0.054*** 0.294*** 0.053*** 0.562*** 0.107***
common in research eld (0.078) (0.013) (0.077) (0.013) (0.175) (0.034)
Age (log of years) 1.286*** 0.233*** 1.324*** 0.238*** 1.299*** 0.239***
(0.412) (0.075) (0.407) (0.074) (0.406) (0.075)
Time at MPS/age 1.592** 0.288** 1.669** 0.300** 1.358* 0.250*
(0.744) (0.131) (0.751) (0.131) (0.749) (0.136)
Industry work experience 0.617*** 0.115*** 0.602*** 0.112*** 0.601*** 0.115***
(yes-no) (0.181) (0.035) (0.181) (0.034) (0.188) (0.037)
German citizenship 0.668*** 0.123*** 0.641*** 0.117*** 0.514*** 0.096***
(0.150) (0.029* (0.147) (0.028) (0.147) (0.029)
Female -0.239 -0.043 -0.250 -0.045 -0.271 -0.050
(0.200) (0.036) (0.203) (0.036) (0.196) (0.035)
Group leader 0.689*** 0.130*** 0.676*** 0.127*** 0.638*** 0.123***
(0.179) (0.034) (0.178) (0.034) (0.170) (0.033)
Director 0.530* 0.099* 0.534* 0.099* 0.512* 0.097*
(0.296) (0.056) (0.298) (0.056) (0.291) (0.056)
Constant -8.776*** -8.001*** -6.128***
(1.518) (1.529) (1.456)
PhD dummies yes yes yes
Section dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood - 633.04 -629.14 -644.78
McFadden's R2 0.200 0.205 0.185
Adjusted Count R2 0.315 0.334 0.302
Notes: Robust standard errors which are adjusted for intracluster correlation within Max Planck institutes
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively. Number of observations 1176.
46Table 6: Cooperation Behavior: Subsequent Cooperation { Model 1b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coe. marg. e. coe. marg. e. coe.(D) marg.e.(D)
Cooperation attractiveness 0.535*** 0.112*** 0.478* 0.087* 0.517 0.105
(0.193) (0.035) (0.276) (0.044) (0.336) (0.069)
Reputational reward -0.035 -0.006 0.274 0.055
(0.175) (0.032) (0.331) (0.068)
Income opportunity -0.372** -0.068** -0.167 -0.033
(0.187) (0.031) (0.516) (0.103)
Time costs -0.248* -0.045* -0.502 -0.101*
(0.131) (0.024) (0.316) (0.061)
Cost sharing 0.370*** 0.067*** 0.709*** 0.143***
(0.108) (0.017) (0.252) (0.052)
Condentiality -0.151 -0.028 -0.649* -0.133*
(0.157) (0.029) (0.352) (0.070)
Dierent approaches 0.189 0.035 0.111 0.022
(academia { industry) (0.169) (0.030) (0.379) (0.076)
No commercial application -0.544*** -0.099*** -1.277*** -0.252***
(0.163) (0.026) (0.454) (0.075)
Basic research focus -0.036 -0.008 0.198 0.036 0.204 0.041
in group (0.135) (0.029) (0.146) (0.026) (0.242) (0.049)
Commercialization 0.375*** 0.079*** 0.368** 0.067** 0.560* 0.115*
common in research eld (0.134) (0.027) (0.164) (0.029) (0.327) (0.068)
Age (log of years) -1.749* -0.373* -1.972* -0.361* -1.989* -0.400*
(1.053) (0.214) (1.141) (0.196) (1.061) (0.206)
Time at MPS/age 1.459 0.311 1.748 0.320 1.851 0.372
(1.507) (0.317) (1.595) (0.285) (1.467) (0.293)
Industry work experience 0.117 0.025 0.473 0.087 0.228 0.046
(yes-no) (0.318) (0.068) (0.342) (0.063) (0.393) (0.080)
German citizenship 0.562 0.118 0.212 0.039 0.344 0.069
(0.349) (0.075) (0.431) (0.079) (0.381) (0.078)
Female -0.128 -0.027 -0.169 -0.031 -0.085 -0.017
(0.576) (0.122) (0.636) (0.116) (0.529) (0.106)
Group leader 0.521* 0.110* 0.281 0.052 0.289 0.058
(0.313) (0.066) (0.315) (0.058) (0.338) (0.069)
Director 1.421** 0.295*** 1.267* 0.229* 1.560** 0.301***
(0.635) (0.112) (0.752) (0.120) (0.652) (0.107)
Constant 2.886 5.357 6.620*
(-3.629) (-4.303) (-3.939)
PhD dummies yes yes yes
Section dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -147.59 -130.23 -140.57
McFadden's R2 0.103 0.208 0.145
Adjusted Count R2 0.219 0.381 0.210
Notes: Robust standard errors which are adjusted for intracluster correlation within Max Planck institutes
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively. Number of observations: 240. 47Table 7: Cooperation Behavior: Planned Cooperation { Model 1c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coef. marg.e. coef. marg.e. coef.(D) marg.e.(D)
Cooperation attractiveness 0.466*** 0.101*** 0.360** 0.071** 0.630** 0.129**
(0.168) (0.033) (0.184) (0.034) (0.317) (0.062)
Reputational reward -0.106 -0.021 0.103 0.021
(0.141) (0.028) (0.265) (0.054)
Income opportunity -0.149 -0.029 0.348 0.070
(0.172) (0.034) (0.618) (0.121)
Time costs -0.109 -0.022 -0.207 -0.042
(0.160) (0.032) (0.352) (0.072)
Cost sharing 0.141 0.028 0.289 0.059
(0.120) (0.024) (0.280) (0.057)
Condentiality -0.328** -0.065*** -0.984*** -0.207***
(0.133) (0.025) (0.286) (0.059)
Dierent approaches -0.056 -0.011 -0.299 -0.061
(academia{industry) (0.163) (0.032) (0.261) (0.053)
No commercial application -0.401*** -0.079*** -1.299*** -0.273***
(0.147) (0.028) (0.433) (0.081)
Basic research focus 0.078 0.017 0.266* 0.053* 0.556 0.109*
in group (0.152) (0.033) (0.148) (0.028) (0.348) (0.066)
Commercialization 0.437*** 0.095*** 0.464** 0.091*** 0.532 0.109
common in research eld (0.151) (0.030) (0.183) (0.033) (0.341) (0.068)
Age (log of years) -0.505 -0.111 -0.735 -0.145 -0.864 -0.176
-1.173 (0.257) -1.214 (0.240) -1.184 (0.241)
Time at MPS/age 0.463 0.102 0.821 0.162 1.070 0.218
-1.392 (0.304) -1.350 (0.265) -1.316 (0.263)
Industry work experience -0.302 -0.066 -0.209 -0.041 -0.277 -0.056
(yes-no) (0.347) (0.076) (0.401) (0.079) (0.409) (0.083)
German citizenship 0.517* 0.114* 0.288 0.057 0.398 0.082
(0.293) (0.066) (0.329) (0.066) (0.320) (0.065)
Female 0.348 0.076 0.348 0.068 0.436 0.088
(0.384) (0.081) (0.415) (0.079) (0.408) (0.078)
Group leader 0.683** 0.149** 0.522 0.103 0.505 0.103
(0.341) (0.071) (0.342) (0.065) (0.334) (0.065)
Director 1.083 0.222 1.008 0.191* 1.334** 0.251**
(0.730) (0.128) (0.664) (0.113) (0.650) (0.103)
Constant -1.863 1.827 2.553
(-4.224) (-4.352) (-4.511)
PhD dummies yes yes yes
Section dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -150.69 -138.83 -141.69
McFadden's R2 0.093 0.164 0.147
Adjusted Count R2 0.235 0.365 0.330
Notes: Robust standard errors which are adjusted for intracluster correlation within Max Planck institutes
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively. Number of observations: 240. 48Table 8: Cooperation Attractiveness: Attitudes towards Commercialization { Model 2a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline baseline (D) extended extended (D)
Reputation: 0.593*** 1.119*** 0.455*** 0.865***
commercialization (0.059) (0.124) (0.058) (0.125)
Open science identity -0.283*** -0.658*** -0.144*** -0.498****
(0.055) (0.139) (0.053) (0.265)
Basic research focus -0.346*** -0.840***
in group (0.068) (0.141)
Commercialization 0.197*** 0.187
common in research eld (0.055) (0.129)
Age (log of years) -0.422 -0.388
(0.372) (0.352)
Time at MPS /age -0.005 -0.011
(0.012) (0.011)
Industry work experience 0.425*** 0.425***
(yes-no) (0.147) (0.151)








PhD dummies yes yes yes yes
Section dummies yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -1625.28 -1643.79 -1535.77 -1553.91
McFadden's R2 0.050 0.040 0.103 0.092
AIC 2.774 2.806 2.651 2.682
Notes: Robust standard errors which are adjusted for intracluster correlation within Max Planck institutes
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. Number of observations: 1176.
49Table 9: Cooperation Attractiveness: Attitudes towards Cooperation { Model 2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline baseline (D) extended extended (D)
Reputational reward 0.302** 0.837*** 0.223 0.833***
(0.133) (0.240) (0.144) (0.252)
Income opportunity 0.406*** 0.991** 0.340** 0.811*
(0.113) (0.408) (0.148) (0.476)
Time costs -0.385*** -0.630** -0.365** -0.636**
(0.118) (0.246) (0.146) (0.255)
Cost sharing 0.170* 0.473* 0.179 0.367
(0.095) (0.245) (0.111) (0.297)
Condentiality -0.052 -0.131 -0.100 -0.277
(0.111) (0.234) (0.113) (0.259)
Dierent approaches -0.146 -0.269 -0.103 -0.136
(academia{industry) (0.124) (0.266) (0.143) (0.282)
No commercial application -0.205** -0.354 -0.201* -0.184
(0.093)* (0.280) (0.110) (0.292)
Basic research focus in group -0.122 -0.717***
(0.150) (0.265)
Commercialization common 0.259** -0.307
in research eld (0.128) (0.312)
Age (log of years) 0.297 -0.180
(0.794) (0.758)
Time at MPS / age -0.002 -0.002
(0.023) (0.025)
Industry work experience 0.769** 0.804**
(yes-no) (0.350) (0.342)








PhD dummies yes yes yes yes
Section dummies yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -290.03 -297.02 -273.027 -278.986
McFadden's R2 0.070 0.048 0.125 0.106
AIC 2.509 2.567 2.509 2.558
Notes: Robust standard errors which are adjusted for intracluster correlation within Max Planck institutes
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. Number of observations: 240.
50